Cyprus From Moving Uk

/2/Detailed reports of the morning discussions were transmitted in telegrams 726 and 727 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.) Ball presented Makarios with an "adjusted proposal." The text of this proposal was transmitted in circular telegram 1482, February 12. (Ibid.) The Embassy provided a detailed report on the afternoon discussions in telegrams 728 and 731 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.) Makarios presented Ball with the text of the Cypriot proposal "preconditioning" acceptance of an international peacekeeping force. This document was transmitted in telegram 742 from Nicosia, February 13. (Ibid.) Ball also met with Vice President Kuchuk in the interval between his two sessions with Makarios. The Embassy reported on this meeting in telegram 729 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.) ... [Read More]

Documents 218-242

/3/The addressees endorsed the language of the document in telegrams 1540 from Ankara, June 3; 581 from Nicosia, June 1; 5749 from London, June 1; 5106 from USUN, June 1; and 1787 from Athens, June 1. (All ibid.) The final text of the memorandum was transmitted to Secretary Rusk for delivery to Foreign Minister Caglayangil in Tosec 97 to Brussels, June 6. (Ibid.) ...

FonMin remarked that UK Ambassador told him of his return to London for consultation on Cyprus with FonOff and colleagues from Athens and Nicosia. FonMin said he thought UK would then consult with us and hoped that US and UK not reach any firm position without consulting Turkey. I replied that any US-UK consultations that might occur would certainly be exploratory. He then asked whether it true that US Ambassadors in Athens and Nicosia had made proposals re Cyprus to respective governments. I said I sure they could not have done so because US has no solution to propose on Cyprus issue. ... [Read More]

Documents 26-54

If Kutchuk would return to his office because of UN presence, he could be serious embarrassment to Makarios. Even if Makarios could insist successfully that all measures of GOC taken during Kutchuk's absence are legal and not subject to Vice-President's veto, he would have difficulty not forwarding future bills or measures to Kutchuk as required by constitution. His only effective alternatives would appear to be: (1) to maintain that Kutchuk was rebel who tried to set up separate Turk-Cypriot administration and therefore had lost authority in government (difficult argument to sustain if GOC has, as it claims, been sending invitations to Kutchuk and other Turk-Cypriot officials to attend scheduled meetings) or (2) to maneuver Turk-Cypriots into holding back from participation until too late. ... [Read More]

Documents 156-175

Mr. Galo Plaza said that it is important to know what type of enosis is being discussed since Makarios' definition is quite different from that of the Greeks. Plaza said that he had urged the Greek Government to sit down with Makarios and arrive at an agreed definition. He has the impression that Greece has pressed Makarios to arrive at such a definition with them, but that Makarios has successfully evaded an answer. Mr. Ball noted the former United States assumption that a strong pro-enosis line from Greece would arouse the latent enosis sentiment on the island and undercut Makarios, but he feels this is no longer possible. Galo Plaza agreed and said he considers Papandreou to be over confident regarding his ability to handle Makarios. He described Makarios as head and shoulders above any other Greek leader, in effect a "Mr. Cyprus" who was capable of running Greece as well. This was apparent from the beginning, Mr. Galo Plaza said, and had convinced him that he must work through Maka ... [Read More]

Documents 78-97

Turning to "(a)"-(Sunalp), he undoubtedly wants to use base for protection of Turkish minority, which is not conferred in haec verba by present treaties. His method of discussion is to confuse all desirable uses of base, jumping from one to another to avoid being cornered. With the able help of our General and Colonel we have pretty well got him pinned inside the Karpas Peninsula as a base for military purpose of housing and training a military force to protect Turkey and Cyprus from foreign foe. From there we will go on to limit his other desired purposes both before and after enosis; but always aware that whatever is said on paper, Turkish military presence will be a deterrent against abuse of the minority and will be used as a corrective if large-scale abuse should occur. Sunalp does not suffer from incapacity to understand our position but from unwillingness to accept it. We shall watch out, however, that we do not give him ground for a plausible claim that he misunderstands. ... [Read More]

Documents 302-342

74061. Literally eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I wish to express to each of you my deep appreciation for the round-the-clock effort you have been making to avoid catastrophe over the Cyprus question. I need not emphasize the scope of the catastrophe for all of us and for NATO if Turkey and Greece should get into a war with each other. What we should keep in mind is that such an event would mean that our bilateral relations with both countries would approach zero for the foreseeable future. Therefore, in dealing with your host country about these issues, you should concentrate on what your host country can do to prevent war and not be unduly worried about whether subsequent bilateral relations will be as comfortable as you would hope. Each one of you should concentrate on how you can persuade your own host government to make a maximum effort to preserve the peace. The stakes are such that the future of our bilateral relations is secondary to the prevention of hostilit ... [Read More]

Documents 55-77

8. At end, Costopoulos said that Greece had been informed during day (Sunday) that Kucuk was about to assert sovereignty over certain areas of Cyprus in expectation that Turkey (and possibly Pakistan and Iran) would support his action by some sort of recognition. His intelligence was that this would take place during Inonu's absence in the States--probably in next couple of days. I said we had heard rumors about possible Kucuk action few days ago and this had given rise to some of our concern. I hoped new rumors were just old ones catching up. Costopoulos said that Greek Cypriots would have to react forcefully against Turkish Cypriots if Kucuk took such action. I strongly urged that in any such event GOG should use every possible influence to have Makarios refer matter to SC without resorting to force. He agreed and was to talk to Kyprianou about it. ... [Read More]

Documents 176-193

991. Deptel 518./2/ Saw Bernardes morning Feb 09 immediately after receiving reftel. He shares our assessment of troop rotation problem. He will see Makarios in next day or two and present strong oral demarche to Makarios which he will follow up with letter for the record. He does not recommend we use SYG yet since once having done so there is little left in our armory in event SYG turned down at this stage. Says he believes Greeks mistakenly thinking in terms of substantial quid pro quo. He has reports from N.Y. that Kyprianou had suggested to UNSYG that appropriate concession by Turks would be turning control of Kyrenia Road over to GOC. Bernardes described this as wildly improbable concession by Turks and indicative of Greek failure make any objective assessment of Turk position. When I outlined Aktulga's exposition of Turkish attitude toward rotation (Ankara's 1152 to Dept)/3/ he agreed saying that he and his staff could not con ... [Read More]

Documents 360-375

7. How should such a conference be convened? Pipinelis was definite that Makarios should not have reason to think this a put-up job between Greeks and Turks. Initiative would need to come from outside. After considering whether US or UK would be well situated to play this role, Pipinelis and Caglayangil had concluded it would be better for initiative to come from Canada which naturally interested and involved through UNFICYP. Thus their secret request to Canada today. Meanwhile they hope US and UK can stand ready to help as needed. In particular, they hope US and UK can encourage Makarios to see importance of proceeding carefully toward agreement with Turk Cypriots on new constitution. ... [Read More]

Documents 343-359

/3/The Prime Minister's letter is printed as Document 350. In telegram 3248 from Athens, January 19, Talbot suggested that the appropriate line of approach would be a direct response from the President. (Ibid., POL GREECE-US) In response to a January 19 memorandum from Rostow outlining Talbot's reasoning, President Johnson wrote: "OK Talbot call on PM. Isn't this sufficient." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol. 3) In telegram 101277 to Athens, the Department of State authorized Talbot to convey orally to Papadopoulos an acknowledgement of his letter and to state the President would soon reply. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE-US) In telegram 3246 from Athens, January 19, Talbot reported that Papadopoulos had been informed by an Embassy official. (Ibid.) ... [Read More]